Japanese Yen (JPY) Exchange Rates on 22nd February 2012 (22/02/2012)
Exchange rate full table
| Updated: 2012-02-22 | |||||||||
| Convert from | Convert to | 1 JPY | Conversion | in currency | Conversion | ||||
 JPY |
 GBP |
0.0079 | JPY to GBP | 125.8939 | GBP to JPY | ||||
| JPY |
 BGN |
0.0184 | JPY to BGN | 54.4108 | BGN to JPY | ||||
| JPY |
 HRK |
0.0713 | JPY to HRK | 14.0277 | HRK to JPY | ||||
| JPY |
 CZK |
0.2367 | JPY to CZK | 4.2255 | CZK to JPY | ||||
| JPY |
 DKK |
0.0699 | JPY to DKK | 14.3089 | DKK to JPY | ||||
| JPY |
 EEK |
0.1561 | JPY to EEK | 6.4061 | EEK to JPY | ||||
| JPY |
 HUF |
2.7167 | JPY to HUF | 0.3681 | HUF to JPY | ||||
| JPY |
 KZT |
1.8422 | JPY to KZT | 0.5428 | KZT to JPY | ||||
| JPY |
 LVL |
0.0066 | JPY to LVL | 152.5648 | LVL to JPY | ||||
| JPY |
 LTL |
0.0324 | JPY to LTL | 30.8198 | LTL to JPY | ||||
| JPY |
 MKD |
0.5789 | JPY to MKD | 1.7275 | MKD to JPY | ||||
| JPY |
 MDL |
0.1474 | JPY to MDL | 6.7844 | MDL to JPY | ||||
| JPY |
 NOK |
0.0704 | JPY to NOK | 14.2081 | NOK to JPY | ||||
| JPY |
 PLN |
0.0394 | JPY to PLN | 25.364 | PLN to JPY | ||||
| JPY |
 RON |
0.041 | JPY to RON | 24.4015 | RON to JPY | ||||
| JPY |
 RUB |
0.3696 | JPY to RUB | 2.7058 | RUB to JPY | ||||
| JPY |
 SKK |
0.2831 | JPY to SKK | 3.5322 | SKK to JPY | ||||
| JPY |
 SEK |
0.083 | JPY to SEK | 12.0544 | SEK to JPY | ||||
| JPY |
 CHF |
0.0113 | JPY to CHF | 88.1753 | CHF to JPY | ||||
| JPY |
 TRY |
0.0219 | JPY to TRY | 45.6644 | TRY to JPY | ||||
| JPY |
 UAH |
0.0997 | JPY to UAH | 10.0262 | UAH to JPY | ||||
Japanese Yen (JPY)
Sign ¥
1 Yen is subdivided into 10 dimes, 100 cents or 1000 mills.
JPY is the currency code for the Japanese yen. Symbolized with the "¥", the JPY is the third most widely held international reserve currency and the fourth most traded currency in open foreign currency markets. Underlying monetary policy and issuance of the JPY is managed by the Japanese central bank, the Bank of Japan (BOF). The BOJ was established in 1882 using a Belgian banking model and was given monopoly powers over controlling monetary policy and the circulation of the JPY.
Coins used:
¥1, ¥5, ¥10, ¥50, ¥100, ¥500
Banknotes used:
¥1000, ¥2000, ¥5000, ¥10000
Central Bank
Bank of Japan
http://www.boj.or.jp
The monetary policy of the BOJ is under continuous scrutiny and criticism as the BOJ holds as its model a system of credit control and managed commercial growth using credit quotas placed on commercial banks. This control system is much different than the mandate of many market economies and more similar to the command and control system of the Chinese central bank. This system has not only been criticized for its role in the credit and development bubble of the 1980's, where the JPY soared in value, but it has also been criticized for the BOJ's refusal to take action to stimulate growth and development into the 21st century. In 1997 the Bank of Japan Act gave the BOJ greater independence and yet attempted to reign in that independence with a gently worded clause in the act stating the BOJ should consult with the government on monetary policy and economic growth given their goals were "harmonious". This gentle attempt failed and the BOJ has retained the same policies of the past without regard to repeated calls for allowing economic stimulus. The value of the JPY has historically made significant moves with its losing almost all value at the end of World War II. But by 1949 the JPY was fixed against the USD and by extension the Bretton Woods system that was in place at the time. When the USD was removed from Bretton Woods, the JPY was still tied to the USD and a new agreement was drafted at a new USD/JPY exchange rate. This rate did not last long as open market supply and demand forced the abandonment of the pegging to the USD and by 1973 the BOJ removed all connections of the JPY to the USD and has since allowed it to float freely. Throughout the rest of the 1970's the JPY continued to show strength against the USD with two primary setbacks being the oil crises of 1974, 1976, and 1979. In the early 1980's all signs were that there was a large appetite for the JPY worldwide, yet the valuation remained relatively stable. This was due to a variety of factors, namely Japan's ties to the United States and interest rate disparities between the two. This connection was completely broken when in 1985 the French Plaza Accord shifted worldwide currency markets against the USD and not the JPY. Over the next 4 years the JPY nearly doubled in value relative to the USD reaching a high in 1995 almost three times the value relative to the USD ten years earlier in 1985. The JPY bubble quickly corrected to 1989 levels as the BOJ battled a post development bubble and debt crisis with the BOJ lowering interest rates near to zero. This crisis finally saw some improvement 13 years later in 2008 when the worldwide credit bubble burst, a bubble in which the JPY had not participated. This left few major currencies with the underlying strength to counter the trend of depreciation, among these the JPY and CHF remain strong. Though this temporary reprieve in the weakness of the JPY and the Japanese economy as a whole was welcome, it has yet to bring the JPY out of its long term disfavor. This has led to the continued argument that the BOJ must take action to stimulate the economy, not simply sit back with its command and control quotas waiting for growth to spontaneously erupt. This reluctance at stimulus may be due to the long term shame the BOJ has held for allowing the 1980's bubble to occur and therefore they are reluctant to once again take any step that would lead them to blame for another crisis. At the same time their policy of JPY stability and zero interest rates has yet to drive innovation, productivity, and markets into a new cycle of growth. As a result of this unexplained reluctance, no doubt rooted in their previous failure, is the cause of the prolonged economic stagnation. The BOJ continued insistence on low interest rates is clearly not enough stimulus if there are not any business or innovators willing to borrow. This has led economists to define a new type of recession that is not simply attached to a decrease in GDP or lack of growth, but as a situation where no one is willing to take risk, borrow, and grow until their individual balance sheets are strong enough to warrant such a move. Therefore for the JPY to make a new move upward, economic balance sheet stimulus is needed in the Japanese commercial sectors. If they hold the JPY this could be accomplished with improved JPY pricing, but is more likely to occur as monetary policies are enacted to repair the balance sheets of companies still reeling from the after affects of the 1980's bubble and the resultant depressed asset values that remain on their balance sheets. In this instance it would be better to somehow address these issues and take them off the table, allowing for forgiveness and repair in order to stimulate the Japanese economy and as a result stimulate the JPY. As of yet any type of move in this direction has not been indicated by the BOJ. In 2010 the BOJ has taken certain steps to even triple the liquidity available to banks and yet the JPY and underlying economy remained stagnant. This move by the BOJ was initially seen as a positive maneuver, but once again it has taught the markets a two fold lesson. The first is that unlimited liquidity is useless without any businesses willing to borrow or invest and that the BOJ may have taken the move in order to silence critics, knowing that there would be no takers of their capital and that this move would giving the appearance of an effort at stimulus.
Other References
Wikipedia article on Japanese Yen
XE.com Live Currency Converter for JPY
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